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Abstract: The governance of common-pool resources can be meaningfully exam-
ined from the somewhat broader perspective of the governance of social-ecological 
systems (SESs). Governance of SESs invariably involves trade-offs; trade-offs be-
tween different stakeholder objectives, trade-offs between risk and productivity, and 
trade-offs between short-term and long-term goals. This is especially true in the case 
of robustness in social-ecological systems – i.e. the capacity to continue to meet a 
performance objective in the face of uncertainty and shocks. In this paper we suggest 
that effective governance under uncertainty must include the ongoing analysis of 
trade-offs between robustness and performance, and between investments in robust-
ness to different types of perturbations. The nature of such trade-offs will depend on 
society’s perception of risk, the dynamics of the underlying resource, and the govern-
ance regime. Specifically, we argue that it is impossible to define robustness in abso-
lute terms. The choice for society is not only whether to invest in becoming robust to 
a particular disturbance, but rather, what suit of disturbances to address and what set 
of associated vulnerabilities is it willing to accept as a necessary consequence. 
Keywords: Resilience, robustness, social-ecological system, common-pool resourc-
es, trade-offs
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1. Introduction
A structure composed of a common-pool resource (CPR), its users, and an associ-
ated governance system is an example of what we call a Social-Ecological System 
(SES). All SESs are subject to a wide variety of perturbations to their govern-
ance systems, the resource users themselves, and to the underlying ecological 
system (e.g. pasture, fishery, lake, forest, or the atmosphere) that constitutes the 
resource. Given such perturbations, the capacity to maintain system performance 
when subjected to external or internal unpredictable perturbations (Carlson and 
Doyle 2002), can be of critical importance in SESs. Here, we define this capacity 
as robustness (following the engineering literature for reasons discussed below). 
System performance here refers to some set of quantitatively measured, desirable 
characteristics of the system such as economic productivity, economic growth and 
environmental quality. Obviously, undesirable characteristics can be robust too, 
so it is important to define performance carefully. In the case of SESs, robustness 
depends jointly on the humanly designed governance system and the resilience of 
the underlying ecological system.
Given increasing pressure on ecosystem services globally, many scholars 
have begun to focus on how to generate resilience or robustness in social-ecologi-
cal systems (Folke 2006). Folke et al. (2002, p. 10), for example, state in a policy 
white paper: ‘Managing for resilience enhances the likelihood of sustaining de-
velopment in a changing world where surprise is likely. Resilience-building in-
creases the capacity of a social-ecological system to cope with surprise. A chang-
ing, uncertain world in transformation demands action to build the resilience of 
the social-ecological systems which embrace all of humanity.’ However, we sug-
gest that from a governance perspective, the question is not only how to generate 
robustness or resilience, but also how to manage trade-offs between robustness 
and performance, and between different forms of robustness to different classes of 
perturbations. It must be noted that the resilience community is well aware of the 
problem of the specifics of ‘resilience of what to what’ (Carpenter et al. 2001) but 
has not emphasized the trade-offs discussed here. Furthermore, we argue that in 
developing robustness to unpredictable perturbations at particular levels or scales 
in the system, we need to accept the potential for increased chances of failure at 
other levels and scales. In fact, we emphasize the notion that only due to short-
term failures we can derive long-term robustness. To put it another way, when all 
‘low-hanging fruit’ is taken to increase robustness cheaply, SESs will eventually 
reach a point at which it is no longer possible to generate additional robustness 
without a cost to performance and/or decreased robustness somewhere else in the 
system.
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Because of challenges that CPR governance systems constantly face, we be-
lieve that a discussion of robustness trade-offs is particularly relevant to the proc-
ess of crafting effective institutional arrangements for common-pool resources. 
We focus especially on CPRs – like irrigation systems – that are characterized by 
substantial investment in the design and maintenance of physical infrastructure. 
Some of the major problems regarding the governance of contemporary irrigation 
systems are related to a lack of understanding by irrigation engineers and develop-
ment specialists of the investment required for the design of relevant institutions 
that will match the ecological- and the engineered-systems as well as the cultural-, 
political-, and social-systems of the users (Lam 2006). Furthermore, present-day 
irrigation systems are challenged by rapid cultural and economic changes as well 
as changing climatic circumstances (Janssen et al. 2007).
Developing a rigorous methodology to define, analyze and explore the policy 
implications of trade-offs between performance and robustness and for robustness 
to different classes of disturbances, lies beyond the scope of this paper. Doing this 
is important, but requires a long-term research agenda (some of the initial efforts 
to set up such an agenda can be found in Rodriguez et al. (submitted)). Instead, 
we rely on biological examples to illustrate such fundamental trade-offs. We then 
extend these ideas to SESs. using concepts from neoclassical economics to aid in 
the discussion.
We will begin the paper by discussing the inconsistent use of terminology 
concerning the robustness and resilience of social-ecological systems. Here, we 
will use the Tower of Babel as a metaphor. We will identify a general confusion 
about the use of terms from various disciplines in the resilience and robustness 
literature, and we will discuss how we will use terminology in this paper. We will 
continue with a discussion of a number of insights concerning robustness trade-
offs that emerge from research on immune systems and ant colonies, respectively. 
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to outlining a general framework 
for understanding robustness trade-offs in social-ecological systems based on in-
sights from biological systems. We will illustrate this framework with case study 
descriptions of irrigation systems.
2. The tower of Babel of resilience and robustness
The concept of resilience, as developed in the ecological literature (Holling 
1973), measures the amount of change or disruption that is required to transform 
a system from being maintained by one set of mutually reinforcing processes and 
structures to a different set of processes and structures. Resilience has become an 
important concept in the study of both particular SES’s (Carpenter et al. 1999a 
1999b; Scheffer et al. 2000; Anderies et al. 2002; Janssen et al. 2004; Carpenter 
and Brock 2004; Walker et al. 2004; Anderies 2005; Anderies et al. 2006; Folke 
2006; Gunderson et al. 1995; Berkes and Folke 1998; Berkes et al. 2003; Gunder-
son and Holling 2002) as well as more general issues including understanding 
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long-term change in human societies (Redman and Kinzig 2003; Janssen et al. 
2003). There are at least two types of resilience considered: ecological resilience 
and engineering resilience (Holling 1996). Engineering resilience assumes that 
ecological systems exist close to a stable steady-state and measures the ability of 
a system to return to this steady state following a perturbation (Pimm 1984). Eco-
logical resilience emphasizes conditions far from any stable steady-state, where 
perturbations can shift a system from one regime of behaviour to another i.e., to 
another stability domain (Holling 1973). An example of engineering resilience is 
a bridge which one would prefer to be close to its stable steady-state. A bridge that 
starts oscillating in the wind is not desirable. When the oscillations of the bridge 
lead to its destruction, another undesirable steady-state is reached. In the normal 
functioning of a lake, the concentrations of various chemical compounds and the 
populations of various organisms may fluctuate over time. These fluctuations may 
allow or even enable the lake to remain within a particular stability domain, as 
measured by some aggregate variable or collection of variables – for example, the 
lake may remain oligotrophic. The capacity to remain in this domain in the face 
of perturbations is what we call ecological resilience. Only when fluctuations lead 
to a structural change, for example from a clear lake to an algae-dominated lake, 
has the system shifted to another stability domain.
Although our thinking is conceptually consistent with ecological resilience, 
we prefer to use a term more commonly used within engineering: robustness (An-
deries et al. 2004; Janssen et al. 2007). The reason for this choice is our focus 
on human constructs and institutional rules designed by humans. Crafted insti-
tutional arrangements aim to stimulate and support a particular performance of 
a SES, like engineers design systems to meet certain performance criteria. Read 
(2005) discusses robustness and resilience for social systems, but his definition of 
resilience is based on the concept of ecological resilience, whereas his treatment 
of robustness is similar to what we have referred to here as engineering resilience. 
We use the term robustness in a similar way as ecological resilience and define it 
as the capacity of a system to maintain its performance when subjected to internal 
and external perturbations. The key difference between robustness and ecological 
resilience as we use it in this paper is the focus in our analysis of humanly de-
signed components within the SES of interest that control responses to perturba-
tions. Unlike the ecological resilience perspective, which often considers human 
activities as perturbations of an ecological system, we consider social-ecological 
systems where humans develop institutional feedback loops to respond to pertur-
bations. In the rest of the paper we will use the term resilience for ecological re-
silience of natural systems, and the term robustness for social-ecological systems 
with man-made control and feedback systems. In sum, several different terms are 
used in the literature for similar or related concepts. A rough distinction between 
these different terms can be drawn by differentiating systems that remain within 
a stability domain and systems that remain in a particular equilibrium state. Con-
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cepts related to the first broad set of systems are ecological resilience (Holling 
1973), robustness (Anderies et al. 2004), and resilience (Read 2005). Concepts 
belonging to the latter type of systems are engineering resilience (Pimm 1984) 
and robustness (Read 2005).
We focus our analysis on SESs where humans engage in many actions to meet 
their various needs, often unrelated to the state of the ecosystem. Institutional ar-
rangements affect the way humans interact. Humans interact directly and indirect-
ly with ecosystems, and governance mechanisms are, among (many) other things, 
meant to avoid the undesirable consequences of impact from human activities on 
ecosystems. Since societies consist of humans with various goals, trade-offs – in-
cluding trade-offs regarding the impacts of human activities on ecosystems – need 
to be made.
Besides the importance of designed components, our use of the term robust-
ness has been inspired by findings from engineering. Although engineered sys-
tems, like airplanes, are designed for robustness, vulnerability cannot completely 
be eliminated. When these systems are exposed to external shocks and character-
ized by significant uncertainty, engineers use the term ‘robust-yet fragile,’ which 
refers to the acknowledgement that to generate robustness to one particular set of 
perturbations, a necessary consequence will be decreased robustness to another 
set of disturbances (Carlson and Doyle 2002). Hence, there is no such thing as 
absolute robustness. There is always a trade-off to be made, and society1 has to 
choose the type of robustness in which it is most willing to invest. Before we 
discuss these trade-offs in SESs, we first discuss the general characteristics of ro-
bustness and resilience within two biological examples: immune systems and ant-
colonies. We then extend these ideas to the social-ecological realm – particularly 
by means of an analysis of several important case studies of irrigation systems.
3. Resilience trade-offs in biological systems
An important framework in the literature on ecological resilience is the adaptive 
cycle (Holling 1986), which characterizes different phases in the dynamics of ec-
ological systems. During the exploitation phase, pioneer species establish them-
selves. Nutrients and biomass consolidate during the conservation phase, which 
eventually leads to a climax. This climax, characterized by over-connectedness, 
makes the system more susceptible to environmental disturbances such as fire, 
insect pest outbreaks, or disease. When a disturbance eventually occurs, the accu-
mulated energy is released in a creative destruction, or release phase. Ecologists 
distinguish different species dominating in the different phases. R-strategists, who 
dominate in the exploitation phase, reproduce quickly and in large numbers and 
are thus better able to cope with unpredictable or variable environments. Typi-
1
 We use the term society to refer to an aggregation of interacting people who share a geographical 
region, a sense of common identity and culture. 
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cal examples of r-strategists are bacteria, insects, and weeds. K-strategists, who 
dominate during the conservation phase, are larger, live longer, produce fewer 
offspring invest more in their offspring than do r-strategists. They are thus able 
to better compete for limited resources and perform well in stable environments. 
Typical examples are elephants, humans, and pine trees.
Ecosystems tend to develop from a phase dominated by r-strategists, to a 
phase dominated by K-strategists. The adaptive cycle acknowledges that the K-
phase is not the end state of an ecosystem. Perturbations can disrupt the K-phase, 
lead to a reorganization of the system, and initiate a new r-phase. When a K-phase 
configuration is highly resilient, the system may again evolve to the same type of 
K-phase configuration. When a K-phase configuration is not resilient, the system 
may evolve, after a perturbation, to a new K-phase configuration that is structur-
ally different than the previous K-phase. For example, forests typically experi-
ence fires after which they recover. However, if fire is suppressed and fuel loads 
build up, a K-phase configuration with low resilience to fire results. Such forests 
are typically not able to recover from the intense forest fires that ensue. The eco-
logical system that emerges after such a fire is fundamentally different from the 
previous forest (Holling 1986).
These different strategies identified in ecosystems help us to discuss differ-
ent ways in which complex systems have coped with a variety of perturbations. 
The diversity of immune systems and ant species that have evolved over many 
millions of years are two important examples of how biological systems cope 
with both predictable and unpredictable disturbances (Janssen and Osnas 2005; 
Linksvayer and Janssen 2006). They illustrate that in the evolutionary pathway, 
different types of responses, including both r and K strategies, have evolved in 
particular responses to particular types of perturbations. These are examples of 
how selective pressures have emphasized different resilience ‘trade-offs’ in dif-
ferent contexts.
Organisms have developed different types of immune systems. The main dif-
ference between immune systems of vertebrates and invertebrates is that only 
vertebrates have what immunologists call an adaptive immune system. Unlike an 
invertebrate, a vertebrate will respond faster the second time a pathogen enters 
its body because of its immunological memory. The adaptive immune system of 
vertebrates arose 500 million years ago and is functionally integrated with their 
ancient innate immune system. The main advantage of adaptive immune systems 
is their ability to match spatial and temporally differentiated defence mechanisms 
with the particularities of pathogen evolution. There are disadvantages of being 
a large, long-lived vertebrate host compared to small and short-lived pathogens. 
Viruses and bacteria multiply rapidly, with generational intervals in the order of 
minutes or hours, which provide them with a great opportunity for mutation and 
evolutionary change. Long-lived vertebrates can never match the pace of patho-
gen evolution, but the adaptive immune system provides an evolutionary adapta-
tion to this mismatch in temporal scales.
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Being a large organism requires significant resource investment in an adap-
tive immune system. The basic function of the adaptive immune system is to 
detect self from non-self cells. It uses a large number of diverse white blood cells, 
lymphocytes, which bind with undesirable intruders. There is a large diversity of 
these lymphocytes, but the diversity can never be large enough to match the full 
repertoire of potential invaders. Therefore the immune system is constantly gen-
erating new variations of lymphocytes (mutations) and replicating lymphocytes 
which were successful in binding to invaders (the immune response). The im-
mune system is not equipped at birth with an appropriate variety of lymphocytes. 
Therefore, the immune system is trained immediately after birth by the mother 
through lactation. Furthermore, the number of lymphocytes is highest just after 
birth, dropping slowly during development to the adult level. A consequence of 
these mechanisms is that adaptive immune systems become tailored through train-
ing to a particular disturbance regime. Changes in disease ecologies later in life 
(for example, through travel) can expose immune systems to unknown pathogens 
for which they have no adequate response. Another problem faced by the adap-
tive immune system is achieving the right balance between tolerance (immune 
response is too late) and rigidity (attacking self-cells, auto immune response).
We see a similar dilemma with the trade-off between small and flexible, and 
large and costly defence mechanisms of colonies of ant species. There is an enor-
mous diversity of ant species (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990). Colony sizes range 
from a few individuals to over a million in some leaf-cutting and army ant species 
to hundreds of millions in some species with supercolonies. Some colonies have 
monomorphic workers with little division of labor, and others have an age-, size-, 
or morphology-based division of labor, with specialized worker subcastes, such 
as soldiers (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990). Some ant species practice individual-
based foraging, while others have more complex foraging strategies based on 
maintained trunk trails.
Andersen (1992) defines ant functional groups based on trade-offs in adapta-
tion according to three types of perturbations: extreme temperatures, habitat dis-
turbance, and competition with other ants. This functional group scheme focuses 
on the responses of taxonomic groups to important predictable and unpredictable 
disturbances on a biogeographic scale (Andersen 1992). Although the scheme 
was developed in Australia, it has also been applied to North American and Neo-
tropical ants (Andersen 1992; 2000). The basic idea is that certain ant-species are 
opportunists (r-strategy), some specialists (stress adaptation), and others general-
ists (K-strategy). The opportunists are tolerant of high levels of habitat distur-
bance and some stress (e.g. narrow range of nest or food resources), but are at 
the same time unspecialized in terms of competitive ability with other organisms 
and ant colonies, and tolerance of extreme temperature stress (Andersen 1992). 
Specialists are adapted to climates that are stressful in terms of extreme tempera-
tures but do not tolerate high levels of habitat perturbation and cannot compete 
with generalists in less stressful environments (Andersen 1992). The generalists 
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prefer less stressful environments with less variability. Colonies of generalists 
are competitive in such environments and develop large colonies with (physical) 
specialization of workers. Such ant species, like leaf-cutting ants, can dominate 
their habitat environment and aggressively defend their territory.
Both of these biological systems illustrate that there is not one solution pro-
viding general resilience. They illustrate a basic trade-off between being small, 
short-lived and flexible, and large, long-lived with heavy investment in response 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there is a large diversity of ways to be small or large 
and hence a diversity of mechanisms to deal with different types of perturba-
tions. We will now extend these ideas to explore robustness trade-offs in social-
ecological systems which are often characterized by the fundamental tension be-
tween devoting resources to live (present consumption) and investing in response 
mechanisms to secure their existence against perturbations and instability.
4. Robustness trade-offs in social-ecological systems
The examples above illustrate fundamental trade-offs faced by biological systems 
in coping with particular types of disturbances. Selective pressures then tune these 
systems to their particular environmental circumstances. Although humans can 
use more comprehensive cognitive processes to make decisions than can lym-
phocytes and ants, we argue that the different components of social-ecological 
systems experience similar trade-offs and selective pressures. However, the rela-
tionship between robustness to different types of disturbances or between robust-
ness and performance is not straightforward. Not as straightforward as between, 
for example, number and size of offspring (r versus K trade-offs) and a trade-off 
that is conditioned by obvious biophysical constraints. In some cases, the tension 
between trade-offs is obvious: simplification of ecological systems enhances pro-
duction but reduces robustness to plant pathogens and pests. On the other hand, 
one can imagine examples where a choice of a particular (re)production tech-
nology brings with it ‘natural’ robustness characteristics. For example, irrigation 
technology not only can increase agricultural production but also can increase the 
robustness of food production to annual fluctuations in precipitation. However, 
if we consider that irrigation infrastructure is sensitive to large floods, we real-
ize that there is a trade-off between enhanced robustness of food output to high 
frequency weather fluctuations (1/yr) and reduced robustness to low frequency 
weather fluctuations (0.01/yr) and thus an indirect trade-off between performance 
and robustness.
Are SESs always susceptible to trade-offs? If this were the case, Pareto fron-
tiers could be constructed for production (performance) and robustness and policy 
choices might be meaningfully informed by these relationships. Such trade-offs 
often emerge from constraints involving some conserved quantity (labor, capi-
tal, mass, energy) conditioned by stoichiometric or technological relationships. 
In fact, it can be shown that for certain types of dynamic systems (linear time 
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invariant) a quantity like ‘fragility’ is conserved (Bode 1945). Specifically, Bode 
(1945) derived an expression for the sum of the logarithm of the sensitivities for 
a linear, time-invariant dynamical system over all disturbance frequencies and 
showed that it was identical to zero. This Bode integral formula – as it is com-
monly referred to today – describes a robustness trade-off present in all feedback 
systems: reducing the sensitivity to disturbances at one range of frequencies by 
feedback control will increase sensitivity to disturbances at other frequencies. 
This insight motivates our use of production possibility frontiers and our empha-
sis on trade-offs, in this paper. Different instances of such trade-offs are explored 
in more detail below.
In their design of components of social-ecological systems, people are not 
necessarily focused on robustness. However, in situations where humans do make 
decisions with regard to robustness, they may have to make a trade-off between 
robustness and performance (Figure 1(A)). For example, households in irrigation 
systems may generate more income by earning wages in nearby urban areas, but 
then have less time available to maintain irrigation infrastructure. If performance 
is measured as household income, the irrigators may be willing to increase per-
formance – i.e. income – with the risk of reducing the stability of the irrigation 
infrastructure. On the other hand, they may accept lower performance – i.e. less 
income – but with the irrigation system functioning at the same level. Another ex-
ample is life-insurance, which makes an income of a household more robust to the 
death of a household member, but leads to a lower performance – i.e. resources to 
spend on consumption – in the short run.
A challenge regarding decisions to invest in enhancing robustness is the lack 
of feedback from previous investments made. Once a society is successful in in-
creasing robustness, a necessary consequence is that fewer undesired impacts are 
experienced. This leaves citizens wondering about the value or necessity of invest-
ment in enhancing robustness. When Hurricane Katrina destroyed New Orleans, 
it became clear to the general public that public governance had failed to maintain 
or enhance the robustness of the city to severe storms. The persistent underinvest-
ment in levees and wetland restoration was known to have reduced the robustness 
of the city, but it was hard to generate the required resources to address these is-
sues (Pinter 2005). After the disaster, the importance of new investments became 
clear and more generally accepted. But time erodes the vividness of experiences 
(Dooley et al 1992). For example, one hundred years after the 1906 earthquake 
that destroyed San Francisco, much of the city is not well prepared for a new one, 
which inevitably will occur in the coming decades (Johnson 2006). Disasters lead 
people to weigh long-term robustness more heavily in decision-making, but over 
time short term performance becomes more important.
Here we see the importance of failures (Dörner 1996; Ormerod 2006; Wilkon-
son and Mellahi 2006; Petroski 2006). When people experience small failures 
regularly, they might be reminded and motivated enough to invest in maintain-
ing the robustness of the system. When no failures are experienced, there is the 
danger that reduced investments will increase the possibility of severe failures. 
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Within civil engineering it is observed that there is a regularity of major failures 
in the design of bridges (Petroski 2006). Every generation of engineers experi-
ences a major failure. With each new generation, lessons from previous failures 
get ignored or forgotten, and less emphasis is put on the double-checking and 
testing of designs.
As discussed above, robustness of social-ecological systems is a somewhat 
misleading terminology since a system might be robust to particular perturbations 
but not to others. In fact, when there is the desire to improve robustness to pertur-
bations of type A, one might have to give up robustness to perturbations of type 
B. This is similar to what we have seen in immune systems and ant colonies. Were 
different strategies in biological systems are a consequence of evolutionary proc-
esses, human societies can make deliberate choices on strategies concerning how 
to trade-off robustness to different perturbation types. Obviously, these trade-offs 
do not necessarily occur between each set of perturbations, but we argue that for 
each perturbation of type A it is likely that there is a perturbation of type B for 
which these trade-offs will occur.
The use of concepts from neoclassical economic theory helps to explain what 
we think are important trade-offs societies must address. It is not a description 
of how people actually make decisions. We often see a focus on increasing the 
robustness to one type of perturbation without realizing that it may decrease 
the robustness to another type of perturbation. Rodriguez et al. (in review) ap-
ply robust control theory to the classical logistic renewable resource problem:
)/1( Kxrxx −= with x the resource size, r the growth rate and K the carry-
ing capacity (Clark 1990). Even for a resource that is forgiving, like the logistic 
renewable resource, they found that there is always a reduction of performance 
when trying to increase robustness. They were also able to develop specific rela-
tionships regarding how improvement in robustness to particular types of shocks 
leads to reduced robustness to other types. 
Figure 1(A): Trade-offs between robustness and performance. The straight line is the budget 
constraint of society. The curves are iso-utility curves for different societies with different risk 
preferences (risk aversion increases from U1 to U3). The best trade-off between robustness 
and performance depends on the (risk) preferences of the participants involved. Figure 1(B): 
Trade-off between investments in system robustness to perturbation type A and perturbation 
type B. Each curve is a production possibility frontier for increasing levels of overall invest-
ment in robustness. 
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In Figure 1(B) we illustrate the dilemma of trade-offs between different types 
of robustness. One cannot become robust to two different potential outcomes of 
climatic change – predicted to lead in one case to a warmer and in another to a 
colder climate – and maintain the same level performance (for example, eco-
nomic productivity). Western Europe faces such a situation where cooling might 
be caused by a change of the ocean currents. Economically, one needs to address 
a trade-off between preparing for one of the potential scenarios and preparing to 
adapt (slower than the first option, but more risk neutral) when a change in climate 
is observed. Such trade-offs cannot be hedged, since compromises might be even 
less desirable. Another option would be to accept lower performance and invest 
in adaptation to both possible situations.
Figure 1(B) shows a number of production possibility frontiers associated with 
increasing investment in robustness (moving to curves further from the origin). 
As long as the marginal cost of increasing robustness is less than the marginal 
benefits of increasing performance, increasing robustness leads to increasing per-
formance. Hence, to a certain extent general robustness can be increased. Adding 
control systems to airplanes increases performance as well as robustness until 
further investments in control systems become so costly that within a constrained 
budget tradeoffs need to be made. The production possibility frontiers in Figure 
1(B) suggest that with increasing performance, trade-offs between different types 
of robustness remain the same (the shapes of the curves are the same regardless 
of their distance from the origin). In the empirical irrigation examples discussed 
below, however, we will illustrate that in increasing performance by increasing 
robustness to A-type perturbations (i.e. moving from one production possibility 
frontier to one further out rather than moving along a particular frontier), the 
trade-off relationship between different types of perturbations is not necessarily 
preserved (Figure 2). Because ecological and social systems exhibit non-linear 
(more importantly, non-convex) relationships between variables and hysteretic 
effects, investments to increase robustness to perturbations of type A, may fun-
damentally alter the dynamics of the system and reduce opportunities to remain 
robust or increase robustness to perturbations of type B. 
5. Challenges for robustness of social-ecological systems
During the last few thousand years, many societies have found, often through 
trial and error, ingenious arrangements to sustain their societies and the resource 
base upon which they depend. We discuss examples of the kind of robustness 
trade-offs made for a number of irrigation systems. In general, irrigation systems 
buffer temporal and spatial variability in water availability. Typically, mountain-
ous areas store water during the winter in the form of snow and ice and provide a 
constant stream of water in the spring/summer. Some irrigation systems include 
human-made reservoirs to store water. As a result of buffering variation in wa-
ter availability, irrigators are then faced with trade-offs concerning water-storage 
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water use. In order to use the water, complex irrigation canal systems have been 
built along with comprehensive institutions that have been developed to coordi-
nate irrigators’ water use. A typical dilemma is the one between upstream and 
downstream irrigators. Upstream irrigators might be willing to provide water to 
downstream irrigators for various reasons, including the help they will receive in 
maintaining the canal system (Ostrom 1990; 1992; Shivakoti et al. 2005) or the 
control of pests (Lansing and Miller 2005).
Although institutions for irrigation systems differ widely around the world, 
long-lived irrigation systems typically have arrangements to address the dilem-
mas associated with both providing and maintaining physical infrastructure and 
institutional arrangements. But as we will discuss below, although long-lived sys-
tems have become robust to familiar disturbances, they may have become vulner-
able to new challenges as a result.
5.1. Robustness trade-offs in Bali: Balancing pests, water and rituals
The Indonesian island of Bali has a complex system of tunnels, canals, and aq-
ueducts to guide water from high in the volcano Crater Lake to the hills densely 
covered with rice fields, below. The Balinese have practiced agriculture in small 
farming communities for about 3,000 years. Originally, they had their agricultural 
sites in coastal swamps, where crops such as taro, bananas, and perhaps swamp 
rice were grown to supplement food from the sea (Lansing 2006). At a certain 
point, pioneering colonists started to grow crops inland in places where natural 
springs had created swamps. Lansing (2006) suggests that the first location of 
Figure 2(A): Non-linearities can generate shifts in the structure of production possibility fron-
tiers. Figure 2(B): If productive activities depend on values of dynamic state variables (as is 
often the case in natural resource systems) hysteretic effects can occur. For example, once the 
robustness of the system to type A perturbations is increased beyond point A, the state variables 
that contribute to type-B robustness may become unstable and decline to zero. In this event, 
to regain the capacity to cope with type-B perturbations, type-A robustness must be reduced 
below point B to allow type-B robustness to recover (which could take a long time). Further, if 
point B is to the left of the y-axis (as it often is), the capacity to cope with type-B perturbations 
may be permanently lost.
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natural-spring irrigation is located near the Sebatu water temple. This small val-
ley has two natural springs and would therefore have been an ideal place to grow 
crops in ancient times. Farmers probably started to experiment with irrigation 
and paddy rice, and started developing tunnels, canals, and aqueducts to use the 
excess water in down-slope locations. The archaeological record contains inscrip-
tions related to irrigation governance between subaks, a group of farmers owning 
land watered by a common source, dated from about 1,000 years ago (Lansing 
2006).
Initially, kingdoms stimulated the creation of irrigation systems and provided 
allowances to create new canals. Expansion of rice farming led to increased use 
of the ‘water mountains’ which required cooperation among farmers and between 
communities which share the same water sources. In the archaeological record, 
we see a reduced influence of the powers of the kings. This did not lead to an 
increase in the power of the villages, as shown in ancient documents, since rice 
terraces were considered private property, rather, the spread of irrigation dimin-
ished the role of village councils, and increased the role of subak temples, which 
transcended the boundaries of individual villages (Lansing 2006). Over time Bali 
became a densely irrigated system that needed explicit coordination institutions 
to make the trade-off between the allocation of water and the spread of pests, as 
will be discussed below.
In time, more and more canals were dug, leading to a complex web of wa-
terways utilizing and recycling the water from the Crater Lake. Coordination of 
such a complex system was only possible when the subaks were coordinating 
their water use activities both within and across subaks. Although their origin is 
not known, it is now well understood that the complex rituals and the spiritual life 
of the Balinese contributed to the seemingly smooth functioning of the irrigation 
system (Lansing 1991).
Subaks experience regular challenges to maintain the internal coherence that 
is necessary for cooperation in maintaining the canal infrastructure, the practice 
of rituals, and the coordination of water use. Interestingly, the governance with-
in subaks differs substantially among the subaks of Bali. Some subaks have a 
strong hierarchical structure whereas others are more democratic and egalitarian. 
Despite the diversity, subaks will monitor each other and put pressure on those 
among them that are not able to get their act together. The non-functioning of 
subaks may be caused, for example, by the corruption of its leaders. Subaks can 
put pressure on other, non-functioning subaks by threatening to cut off water sup-
ply. Subaks are motivated to keep other subaks on track since their cooperation as 
well as their internal operation is needed for the successful coordination of water 
allocation and pest control.
As stated above, besides guaranteeing the availability of water, irrigation sys-
tems in Bali also need to coordinate in order to control pests (Lansing 1991). On 
the one hand, controlling of pests is most effective when all rice fields in a water-
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shed have the same schedule of planting. On the other hand, the fact that terraces 
are hydrologically interdependent, and are comprised of long and fragile systems 
of tunnels, canals, and aqueducts, means that large areas of rice cannot be planted 
at the same time. To balance the need for coordinated fallow periods and the use 
of water, a complex calendar system has been developed that details what actions 
should be taken on each specific date by each organized group of farmers, i.e. the 
subak. These actions are related to offerings to temples, which range from small 
temples at the rice terrace level to temples at the regional level and, all the way up 
to the temple of the high priest Jero Gde, the human representative of the Goddess 
of the Temple of Crater Lake. Crater Lake feeds the groundwater system, which 
is the main source of water for irrigating in the entire watershed. These offerings 
are collected as a counter gift for the use of water that belongs to the gods.
During the history of more than 1,000 years of irrigation, Bali irrigators de-
veloped a complex physical irrigation infrastructure and associated institutional 
arrangements to coordinate water use and pest control. Lansing (2006) suggests 
that the strong interdependencies among the subaks may have triggered the de-
velopment of religious practices that create shared norms and world views that 
stimulate irrigators to be cooperative. The Bali irrigation system temporarily ex-
perienced a change in the robustness trade-offs when during the Green Revolu-
tion in 1960s, farmers were forced to shift to different rice varieties with different 
characteristics for the timing of planting and harvesting. The function and power 
of the water temples were invisible to the planners and engineers from abroad as 
they regarded agriculture as a purely technical process. Farmers were also stimu-
lated by governmental programs that subsidized the use of fertilizers and pes-
ticides. After the governmental incentive program started, most of the farmers 
continued performing their rituals, but they no longer coincided with the timing 
of rice-farming activities. Soon after the introduction of the miracle rice, a plague 
of plant-hoppers caused huge damage to the rice crop. A new variety was intro-
duced, then a new pest plague hit the farmers. Furthermore, there were problems 
of water shortage.
During the 1980s, an increasing number of farmers wanted to switch back to 
the old system, but the engineers interpreted this as religious conservatism and 
resistance to change. It was Lansing (1991) who unraveled the function of the 
water temples, and was able to convince the financers of the Green Revolution 
project on Bali and the World Bank that the irrigation was best coordinated at the 
level of the subaks with their water temples. Most of the subaks have returned to 
the previous ritual tables. However, the irrigation system now experiences other 
challenges. For example, alternative sources of income have become more widely 
available, leading to a shortage of labor in the subaks. This reduces the ability of 
the subaks to maintain the community structure and ritual practices that facilitate 
the maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. For years, Bali irrigators were 
successful in balancing water availability and pest occurrences and thus became 
robust to two types of perturbations. The cost for achieving a high performance 
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was a long time investment in coordination and ritual practices. In a globalizing 
economy, new opportunities have emerged for the younger generation to generate 
income (like the tourist industry). As the younger generation benefits from these 
new opportunities, the robustness of the Bali irrigation system is challenged since 
less time is invested to maintain the ritual practices. Lansing anticipates that the 
long-term high performance of the Bali irrigation may come to an end due to these 
new challenges (personal communication).
5.2. Robustness trade-offs in the Goulburn Broken: balancing salt, water 
and agricultural productivity
The Goulburn Broken Valley in southeastern Australia is a typical example of a 
modern, large-scale irrigation system that has completely transformed the land-
scape. The catchment’s location within Australia and the present land cover are 
shown in Figure 3. The elevation drops moving from the southeast to the north-
west. Prior to European settlement, which began in the mid 19th century, most 
of the catchment area was covered in native vegetation. At present only about 10 
percent of the area is under native vegetation (green/darker shades area in Figure 
3). Now, the catchment consists of three primary land-use types. First is the Shep-
parton Irrigation Region (SIR) – 500,000 hectares on riverine plains in the lower 
catchment. Approximately 60 percent of this land area is irrigated, with native 
vegetation types having been reduced to less than 2 percent of their pre-European 
extent. Roughly 88 percent of the irrigated land is pasture for dairy production. 
The riverine plains and low foothills between the forested highlands and the SIR 
constitute the mid catchment. Less than 15 percent native vegetation cover re-
mains in this area and land use is dominated by broad-acre cropping. Finally, the 
upper catchment, Eildon Resevoir, is a large area of predominantly public land 
above the major water storage in the catchment. Total forest cover in this region 
is relatively unchanged since European settlement. 
This transformation was made possible by enhancing the robustness of agri-
cultural production to short-term fluctuations in rainfall. Most notably, Lake Eil-
don (see figure 3) using irrigation infrastructure developed over the last 100 years 
including several dams and an extensive canal system has drastically reduced 
variations in water supply. This increase in robustness to short-term fluctuations 
in rainfall has tremendously increased performance (measured as agricultural out-
put).
However, the discussion above suggests that such increases in robustness to 
short-term fluctuations will be accompanied by a decrease in robustness to other 
types of perturbations. In the case of the Goulburn Broken, this decreased robust-
ness is caused by high water tables and highly saline groundwater. Specifically, 
by clearing the Mid Catchment and SIR for grazing and irrigation activities, na-
tive vegetation with a relatively high evapotranspirative capacity was replaced
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Figure 3: Location of the Goulburn Broken Catchment (GBC) with the major rivers and land 
use types. 
with grass and crops with a relatively low evapotranspirative capacity. Thus, 
more water flows past the root zone of the vegetation and reaches the ground-
water system. This has caused water tables to rise – reaching the surface in some 
cases – bringing with them salt mobilized from paleo salt deposits. The result has 
been waterlogging, increased soil salinity, and increased salinity in rivers. Ironi-
cally, in becoming more robust to dry periods, the system has become less robust 
to wet periods.
In 1973, very heavy rain generated a crisis in the Goulburn Broken Catchment 
when water tables rose to the surface in many places. This event was labeled as a 
crisis because of the scale of the economic loss and the fact that even though some 
actors were well aware of rising water tables and their consequences, it came as 
a real surprise to many. According to estimates, if nothing were done, high water 
tables could destroy the economic base of the entire region. Under pre-European 
conditions similar wet periods would not have generated a crisis. That is, during 
that time the system was robust to wet periods, as the ground water system could 
absorb all the water, but it was not robust to dry periods and primary production 
would suffer during droughts. The investment in irrigation infrastructure has now 
reversed these robustness characteristics.
It would seem that a natural response to such a crisis – i.e. the wet spell that 
occurred in 1973 – would be to focus on enhancing the capacity of the system to 
cope with wet periods. In terms of Figure 1(B) this would mean either shifting 
investment and moving along a production possibility frontier or increasing in-
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vestment overall and moving to a curve further away from the origin. However, in 
the case of the Goulburn Broken Catchment, the increase in robustness to drought 
has fundamentally altered the biophysical system so that the situation is more like 
that in Figure 2(A) or (B). Specifically, increased soil salinities and waterlogging 
make re-vegetation difficult so the production possibility frontier shifts from the 
dash-dot curve to the solid curve. If soil salinities become too high – as is the case 
in some areas, currently – recovery and revegetation is impossible and the only 
way to reduce water tables is through pumping. In this case, the situation is as 
depicted in Figure 2(B) (Anderies et al. 2006, Anderies 2005).
In addition to these biophysical limitations, institutional and economic con-
straints have further limited the ability of the Goulburn Broken Catchment to 
increase robustness to wet periods and salinity problems. In fact, Anderies et al. 
(2006) contend that the actual responses of resource management agencies re-
duced intervention options and further decreased, rather than increased, the sys-
tem’s robustness to shocks. This is the result of an irrigation ideology – the per-
ceived need to control water and put it to valuable use. Australia has a long history 
of heavy investment in irrigation infrastructure – arguably a part if its national 
identity – including the Snowy Mountains Scheme. Begun in 1949 and completed 
in 1974, the immense project diverts water from the Snowy River to the Murray 
Darling Basin in which the Goulburn Broken Catchment is located. Such heavy 
national investment in irrigation infrastructure has encouraged low value, high 
water use activities (dairy) and left little incentive for efficient water use (Lang-
ford et al. 1999). The regional economy became ‘tuned’ to irrigated agriculture 
with the production and processing of dairy and horticultural goods generating 
roughly half the regional economic output. The crisis of 1973-74 and the idea that 
such a large portion of the regional economy was under threat had a major impact 
on communities and government.
The state government responded by introducing new institutions and devolv-
ing responsibility for management to regional communities. Concurrent reforms 
in the state water management agencies and the appointment of an interstate com-
mission to manage the Murray Darling Basin created the larger scale institutional 
framework in which the Goulburn Broken Catchment now operates (Langford 
et al. 1999). The formation of the Murray Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) 
established a mechanism for community groups to access federal resources for 
large-scale infrastructure development (see http://www. mdbc. gov.au/). The re-
gion now operates within a four-way partnership between the community, local 
government agencies and state and national agencies. The key point here is that 
the response by communities and government did not emphasize revegetation 
(moving along a curve in Figure 1(B)). Rather, it focused on investment in the 
generation of more complex, large-scale institutional structures to manage an in-
creasingly sensitive system based on enhanced technical efficiency and engineer-
ing solutions (move out to a curve further from the origin in Figure 1(B)). This re-
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sponse likely changed the shape of the curve as in Figure 2(A), or moved beyond 
the point of no return as in Figure 2(B). In sum, the past focus on irrigated agricul-
ture has led to a trajectory for economic and institutional development that leaves 
very few options for the real, large-scale changes needed to make the Goulburn 
Broken Catchment capable of dealing with minor change. Through this process, 
the Goulburn Broken Catchment may have become highly optimized in its ability 
to continue to generate high output from irrigated dairy activities while tolerating 
high water tables and soil salinity. However, the system has become much more 
vulnerable to wetter climate phases and shifts in larger scale social and political 
processes (e.g., salt quotas). It seems that this process of foreclosure of options in 
pursuit of efficiency dictated by past investment toward a highly optimized, but 
extremely fragile system is, if not inevitable, unfortunately, very likely for many 
social-ecological systems. 
The examples presented here are particular examples of the robustness 
trade-offs depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Each case exhibits typical characteristics 
common to many SESs: human populations exploiting a complex set of natu-
ral resources that interact on multiple spatial and temporal scales, investment in 
physical infrastructure aimed at reducing environmental variation to enhance pro-
duction, investment in the creation and maintenance of institutional arrangements 
aimed at fairly distributing the resources generated by physical infrastructure, 
and maintaining the physical infrastructure itself. In these cases, robustness to 
particular spatial and temporal variability can be maintained as long as a system 
can continue to produce sufficient social and physical infrastructure. However, 
increasing investment is often required to maintain system performance as social 
and physical infrastructure becomes more complex (Tainter 1988). In the case 
of Bali, the investment was made to fine-tune the rituals in order to coordinate 
an increasingly complex system of irrigation canals. In the case of the Goulburn 
Broken Catchment, investments were made in physical infrastructure to maintain 
a desired groundwater level and to control salinity levels in soils and waterways. 
In both cases, the systems lost their ability to adapt to new challenges, such as al-
ternative sources of income (Bali), wetter climate phases and shifts in larger scale 
institutions such as salt quotas (Goulburn Broken Catchment). 
6. Discussion
Although there have been many failures of local-scale social-ecological systems 
(Tainter 1988), at a broader scale, human societies have persisted and continue 
to thrive and evolve. However, the recent globalization of social, economic, po-
litical, and ecological processes generates important opportunities and challenges 
for the robustness of social-ecological systems (Young et al. 2006). As a result 
of globalization, experience and technology can be shared, which may increase 
robustness in some domains. But we also see important challenges. Institutional 
solutions which are successful in one location are imitated and implemented in 
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other locations which are not appropriate. This leads to a decrease of institutional 
diversity which, in turn, causes the loss of local knowledge and expertise that is 
required to solve collective action problems in many diverse situations such as 
in the case of the Green Revolution and its consequences for the Bali irrigation 
system discussed above. 
The concepts of resilience and robustness coupled with the idea of the adap-
tive cycle (Gunderson and Holling 2002), implies that small cycles of failure 
and recovery need to be accepted to avoid the occurrence of large scale failures. 
Therefore, we may tolerate modest failures at the system level and intelligently 
experiment with different institutional designs. This may mean that we have to 
accept the failure of local and regional social-ecological systems, at least tem-
porarily, in order to learn how to improve the robustness properties of social-
ecological systems at larger scales. To maintain robustness of social-ecological 
systems in the longer term, we may need to avoid the temptation of specializing 
our responses to increase robustness to specific perturbations. In order to maintain 
the ability to make robustness trade-offs as conditions change, one has to accept 
being somewhat less robust to particular classes of disturbances in order to remain 
flexible to adjust system robustness characteristics when changes occur.
This approach runs counter to the policy recommendations in much of the re-
source management literature that focuses on developing very specific responses 
based on specific models of the relevant social, economic, and ecological proc-
esses which are often assumed to be perfectly understood. When uncertainty 
about these underlying processes is admitted, it is typically assumed that the dis-
tributions for the unknown variables are perfectly known. Policy based on such 
characterizations of uncertainty is fundamentally about making the best bet when 
the odds are known. In fact, the odds are never really known: developing policy 
to cope with high levels of uncertainty is not akin to playing a game of chance 
repeatedly. The approach discussed above, which recognizes and seeks to man-
age fundamental robustness trade-offs, on the other hand, takes as its starting 
point that irreducible uncertainty is at the core of policy issues (rather than some 
form of optimality condition), that it is impossible to hedge away all such uncer-
tainty (society cannot become robust to all disturbances), and that understand-
ing the robustness trade-offs associated with policy decisions is core to sound 
policy development. This approach shares many attributes with resilience-based 
management as discussed above. Our observation that there is no free lunch for 
robustness might sound obvious for some readers. Therefore, it is important to 
remind readers that most of the discussion within the resilience/robustness com-
munity focuses on enhancing resilience/robustness in general, without addressing 
the crucial question of the fundamental trade-offs involved (Folke et al. 2002). 
We do not claim that all SESs are at the point where trade-offs must be made, but 
we suggest they will eventually reach such a point. This frontier might be reached 
either as a consequence of increasing intensity of resource use, or due to changes 
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in the SESs (e.g. climatic change) that will constrain existing activities. There is 
more to robustness trade-offs than not having a ‘free lunch’. Not only can these 
robustness considerations be costly in terms of implementation, they can also lead 
to a collapse of the SESs when society tunes the system to be robust to very spe-
cific disturbances, and makes it vulnerable to unanticipated challenges.
The study of robustness trade-offs offers the possibility of developing more 
specific policy based on a rough characterization of a particular SES. It thus takes 
many important ideas from the resilience literature and moves them toward more 
practical application. However, more research needs to be done to understand 
these trade-offs in SESs, and this paper provides a modest contribution to that 
venue.
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